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Abstract. Today the Internet is a valuable source of information as well as a 
powerful communication medium, with undoubted social and economic bene-
fits, however it also poses some security risks. Viruses may hide in email at-
tachments or in apparently innocent applications directly downloadable from 
the Internet. In this work we give a brief overview of virus types and main de-
fense techniques. Then we present statistical data of virus attacks revealed by 
an anti-virus SW activated on our e-mail server, and discuss results in terms of 
virus types and temporal distribution. 
1   Introduction 
Network communications represent an easy means for the spread of viruses. Internet 
users are constantly threatened by the spread of new viruses hidden in appealing 
objects such as jokes, games, chats, and e-mails ostensibly sent by friends. Although 
Internet services such as e-mail and www represent the main "open doors", floppy 
and CD disks are still minor "contributors". 
The damage provoked by infections can be very costly for an organization's time 
and resources and becomes critical when it affects sensitive systems and data. A basic 
rule in computer security is to make frequent backups to avoid any kind of data de-
struction or corruption.  
Various countermeasures can be applied to prevent infections, such as activating 
an anti-virus SW, or setting filter rules on the e-mail server in order to discard dan-
gerous files present in the message. Another important factor is awareness of the 
problem: users must become familiar with both risks and elementary defense tech-
niques (i.e. do not open executable files, disable automated macro activation, etc.).  
In this work we present data statistics of virus attacks revealed by an anti-virus SW 
activated on our e-mail server and discuss results in terms of virus types and temporal 
distribution.  
The paper is organized into two parts. The first part includes a brief overview of 
virus types and main defense techniques; the second shows the results of our experi-
mentation. 
2   Virus overview 
The term "computer viruses" refers to programs designed to spread themselves by 
infecting executable files, system areas, hard or floppy disks, etc. without the user's 
knowledge. In addition to this self-replication activity viruses can perform 'bad' ac-
tions (payloads) ranging from mild disturbance (annoying the user with silly mes-
sages) to provoking damage or outright disaster (e. g. deleting/corrupting files or 
performing a Denial of Service (DoS) attack).  
A computer is infected when a copy of the virus resides in the machine. Once the 
virus is loaded into the memory it can run in background and start to replicate itself. 
If the infected computer is on the network the infection will propagate very quickly to 
other machines. This process can be interrupted only by detection and elimination of 
the virus.  
The best-known virus types include: 
 Parasitic. Parasitic viruses (or file viruses) are code fragments that reproduce by 
attaching themselves to executable files. When the user starts the infected program, 
the virus is launched first and then, in order to hide its presence, it triggers the 
original program to be opened. The parasitic virus acquires the same rights as the 
original program and thus is able to self-replicate, and to release its payload.  
 Worm. An Internet worm, unlike a virus, does not infect other program files but 
uses computer networks and takes advantages of SW bugs to replicate itself. A 
worm scans the network for another system having one specific security hole (such 
as buffer overflow), and copies itself into the new machine (via smtp, ftp, http, 
Internet Relay Chat, etc.) and then continues the self-replication process. Thus it 
has the ability to self-replicate incredibly quickly. Furthermore, the worm can re-
lease a payload such as scheduling a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack 
toward a target system or network. 
 Trojan Horses. A Trojan horse is a program which hides malicious code dis-
guised in appealing shapes i.e. it claims to do something "cool" or useful while ac-
tually provoking damages. Trojan horses are not designed to replicate automati-
cally. 
 Macro. Macro virus is one of the most common types of viruses for various rea-
sons: it requires little skill to write; many common applications (word processing, 
spreadsheet, presentation) make use of macros; and lastly, documents (such as re-
ports, slides, etc.) are frequently exchanged between users. Macro viruses are self-
replicating macros that can become active if the user opens, closes or saves an in-
fected document. However recent versions of these macro-enabling applications 
display an alert concerning macro-virus risks and permit disabling of macro execu-
tion. 
 Boot sector. A boot sector virus infects computers by modifying the contents of 
the boot sector program, replacing the legitimate contents with the infected ver-
sion. This type of virus can only infect a machine if it is used to boot the system 
up. These viruses no longer represent a threat since operating systems now protect 
the boot sector, and floppy disks are actually unusable for storing modern (and 
large-size) applications.  
 Hoaxes. We also mention hoaxes, which not are actually viruses but simply mes-
sages containing false information (usually alarming!) and/or instructions in 
pseudo-technical language, inducing unskilled people to perform actions which 
can provoke some damage. The user is often instigated to send this message to 
everyone in its address book. The result is an Internet chain letter, which provokes 
a flood of unnecessary emails and wastes bandwidth.  
Although the main platform for spreading viruses is Windows, due to its widespread 
diffusion, possible infection vectors and vulnerabilities are also present in Unix 
(which registered a noticeable increase of bugs in "open source" SW), Macintosh, and 
also openVMS systems. 
The virus trend in the few past years shows that the macro and boot viruses are de-
creasing greatly whereas, reflecting the mutation of their habitat conditions (increase 
and spread of networks), executables and worms represent the new threat.  
The CERT/CC annual report for the year 2001 includes worms and DoS in the 
most common intruder activities and also underlines the increasing threat of attacks 
against or using DNS and routers [1], [2]. 
2.1   Infection  
The main vehicle for spreading viruses is the Internet: millions of interconnected 
networks and systems represent a fertile ground for electronic infections. Once a 
computer is infected, the virus tries to take advantage of system and/or network vul-
nerabilities and by means of communication protocols and network resource sharing, 
is able to infect other hosts. 
Although operating system and application safeguards are increasing, viruses con-
tinue to spread. Many factors contribute to facilitating the propagation of viral infec-
tions including the following [2]: 
 The Internet was designed to favor simplicity and reliability when communication 
media were unstable, and to be open (i.e. fully interoperable), but basic protocols 
did not include native security mechanisms. In addition, the ability to attack a sys-
tem depends on the 'global' security of the Internet: a DoS attack for instance takes 
advantage of other weak points in the network. 
 Very relevant is the problem of SW bugs which are potential security holes used 
by hackers to penetrate the systems. The growing request for new applications and 
the short time-to-market requirements impose very short deadlines, which can re-
duce software quality and reliability. The number of vulnerabilities reported to 
CERT is constantly increasing (in 2001, double the number in the previous year). 
 Viruses and in general attack tools became more sophisticated, increasing the level 
of automation, the modularity and the speed of replication (the infection is very ac-
tive). Polymorphic viruses change dynamically, creating different variations thus 
making detection more difficult. They can use different encryption schemes and 
functions, vary the command sequence, etc. In addition the use of protocols such 
as HTTP or IRC which generate high and heavy traffic require many resources to 
efficiently analyze data and discern between legitimate and fraudulent traffic. As a 
consequence it becomes harder to prevent and avoid attacks. 
 Active contents. This term refers to technologies such as Java, ActiveX, Javascript, 
etc. that can activate the dynamic execution of programs or code, client side. These 
languages offer many advantages such as decreasing the web server load (by mov-
ing the execution overhead from server to clients) and simplification of user inter-
faces. The problem is that malicious code may be hidden in the downloaded SW 
(i.e. to take advantage of the browser's vulnerabilities). Although digital signature 
can be associated with active content (i.e. a signed applet) assuring content integ-
rity and origin authentication, there is no guarantee that this SW will not provoke 
any damage [3]. 
 User ignorance of security risks and mechanisms, together with increasing automa-
tion of applications (designed to facilitate user interaction) play a fundamental role 
in virus propagation. For instance, a large number of infections are propagated via 
email: the virus replicates itself by automatically mailing its copies to addresses 
contained in the user's address book. The user double-clicks on an attachment 
starting the application associated with its MIME1 type (Multipurpose Internet 
Mail Extensions [4], [5]), thus enabling the virus to infect. Worse, some old ver-
sions of e-mail clients, in order to make the process friendlier, automatically trig-
gered the application’s execution on message reception (default option), thus in-
creasing the virus' power to infect.  
2.1   Prevention   
 
A few basic norms can contribute to reducing the risk of infection and/or to limiting 
damage. Computer viruses usually act with the unwitting cooperation of the user. An 
effective defense is having the basic skill to deal with the problem as well as the full 
awareness of our behavior. The use of the following basic norms throughout the or-
ganization can contribute to a very effective anti-virus strategy: 
 First of all: investing in education, making users security-aware. User education 
plays a fundamental role in preventing infections. Many viruses are activated by 
the user’s unwitting complicity: i.e. double-clicking e-mail attachments, download-
ing files from the Internet, etc. People are curious and they are strongly tempted to 
try new tools or applications. Some guidelines include: 
- Do not trust file extensions. Fake extensions can be attached to executable 
files in order to trick the user (ie. XXX.VBS.COM or YYY.DOC.EXE).  
                                                          
1 MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) [RFCs 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049] was 
conceived as an extension of the format of e-mail messages defined in RFC822 to permit the 
inclusion of multimedia data in the body of the message, while retaining its compatibility 
with the standard format. MIME defines basic data types text, image, audio, video, applica-
tion, message and multipart. For each data type more subtypes can be defined (i.e. text/plain, 
text/html, image/tiff, image/gif, etc.). The Content-type header field specifies the media 
type/subtype of data in the body of a message and its canonical form. A multipart MIME 
message is a structured message composed of several parts containing different data types. 
Message parts are delimited by means of a “Boundary”: a string starting with two --. The last 
boundary is also closed with two -- in order to end the message. 
- When possible, disable all forms of automatic script or program start-ups 
such as Active and Java scripting; 
- Exchange documents in printable formats i.e. PDF or PS, or in formats 
which do not contain macros such as Rich Text Format (RTF) instead of MS 
Word files, if they do not need to be modified;  
- Do not use self-extracting files that do not show archive content; 
- Report any virus alarm to the security administrator who can discern be-
tween genuine and false information (hoaxes); 
- Set the PC to boot from drive C thus eliminating the effectiveness of boot 
sector viruses.  
 Define an ad hoc security policy for your organization, including network monitor-
ing and traffic control [6], [7]. The use of anti-virus software is only one compo-
nent of an effective security policy, which in large organizations whose work is 
based on the net (i.e. e-commerce and e-business companies) requires a thorough 
and accurate analysis and evaluation, which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, at the very least one should:  
- block the transfer of executable files (i.e. EXE, VBS, etc.) on the Internet 
gateway and/or e-mail server; 
- configure servers disabling features/services not explicitly required,  
- configure routers/firewalls enabling only traffic to authorized servers and 
ports; 
- run and maintain updated anti-virus software in order to detect, report and, 
when possible, disinfect viruses; 
- read security bulletins and rapidly apply SW patches to OS and/or applica-
tions; 
 Maintaining fully effective backup procedures for systems, applications and data, 
in order to retrieve safe copies, in case of virus attack. 
In addition Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), which conduct analyses of live net-
work traffic [8] and Honeypots, usually single systems that emulate systems, known 
services or vulnerabilities, or create jailed environments, can contribute to monitoring 
network and system activities and detecting attacks [9], [10]. 
2.3   Damages of virus attack 
Virus penetration can occur when the anti-virus is unable to recognize a new virus. It 
is difficult to evaluate the costs that a company must sustain to recover damages be-
cause they depend on many factors such as virus penetration, value of the corrupted 
data, recovery capacity of the organization, nature of company business, etc. Dam-
ages are not only quantifiable in terms of money but can include:  
 time and resources necessary for disinfecting systems and restoring data and appli-
cations;  
 work time lost until systems are restored; 
 eventual interruption of network connection and therefore possible loss of revenue;  
 decreased credibility for customers;   
 violated confidentiality and possible stolen information. 
To these consequences must be added the psychological factor, inducing persons 
afraid of contracting viruses to be removed from newsgroups and mailing lists.  
To give an idea of the global economic impact of virus damage we only report data 
from Computer Economics, which estimated the full impact of Code Red to be 2.6 
billion dollars [11].  
Therefore, in order to limit damage, it is very important for large companies to de-
tect and eradicate the infection as soon as possible, in order to restore systems and 
data. 
3   The studio 
In this paragraph we discuss general features of anti-virus SW and discuss data col-
lected by anti-virus SW running on our e-mail server. 
3.1   Anti-virus SW 
Today the market offers a large set of sophisticated anti-virus strategies [12]. How-
ever, basic anti-virus techniques include [13]: 
 Scanners that perform detection and disinfection of all known viruses (virus sig-
nature based systems). They are easy to use and furnish info about virus and in-
fected files. The main problem is that to remain effective they must be constantly 
updated. 
 Checksummers rely on detecting changes: if a virus infects an object then it 
changes. The main disadvantage is that they only detect infection but are unable to 
prevent it. In addition, checksummers’ output must usually be evaluated by skilled 
personnel, to distinguish between legitimate and viral changes.  
 Heuristics anti-virus software applies rules to detect viruses. However heuristic 
analysis remains effective only if new viruses are a re-make of an existing one (i.e. 
if it uses the same method of replication), otherwise the rules (and thus the SW) 
need to be updated. In addition heuristic software can mistakenly label objects as 
viruses when they are not, thus generating 'false alarms'.  
The anti-virus SW (and/or content filtering) should be set up in strategic positions 
where the Internet traffic naturally flows, such as a point of access of network pe-
rimeter:  
 Internet/intranet gateways or routers or firewalls or proxies. On the connection 
points between the internal networks and the Internet it is possible to check all in-
coming and outgoing traffic, as they represent possible virus entry points. Depend-
ing on the network's architecture, the use of anti-virus software or filtering rules at 
this level (i.e. for discarding unauthorized traffic) could be a way to catch or stop 
the virus before it enters the network and infects the systems. The main problem at 
this level is that encrypted files are not interpretable in transit but only upon arrival 
at the final destination and the inspection of traffic content means loading the CPU 
with an additional overhead that, if consistent, could slow down the data transit. 
 E-mail servers. The anti-virus SW on the e-mail server permits scanning of every 
incoming and outgoing message (i.e. each MIME part composing the message) and 
removal of infected parts. Also in this configuration encrypted files are not inter-
pretable in transit. 
 Servers. If the organization utilizes centrally stored shared information (i.e. 
groupware server) the anti-virus SW can run on this server, thus reducing the net-
work traffic in comparison to a client-side distributed solution. 
 User system. Virus scanning on the client side is very important: if the virus pene-
trates the Internet gateway and/or firewall and overcomes the server scanner, it 
could be intercepted on the user system. In addition it must not be forgotten that a 
user desktop can represent a direct point of access for viruses, if he/she accesses an 
infected file on CD or floppy disk. However anti-virus SW in a user desktop can 
create problems such as late program execution when the scanning is active. An-
other drawback of this solution, also considering the increasing use of mobile com-
puters, and the high number of clients in large organizations, is to keep the anti-
virus software updated.  
In large and complex networks an anti-virus multi-layered approach (e.g. using the 
anti-virus in all points of access) can be adopted, in order to compensate for the weak 
points of one layer with the strength of another. However, given that virus scanning 
shows limitations in detecting new viruses, this approach results ineffective if each 
layer preserves the same weakness. Therefore different contra-measures must be 
applied in order to build protection levels with different features [14]. 
3.2   The environment 
The operative environment is represented by a research organization. Inside our or-
ganization we host e-mail services for various domains thus managing about 1000 
user accounts globally.  
The anti-virus SW was activated in August 2001. Before, we simply set up rules in 
our e-mail server in order to block potentially dangerous files such as executable or 
known viruses (based on file name or MIME type). However, the increasing number 
of new viruses and the need for a more reliable content filtering process, led us to 
adopt an anti-virus SW, to automate and simplify this task.  
Since the effectiveness of anti-virus software depends on frequent updates, its ad-
ministration is of critical importance. For distributing updates pushing, pulling or 
mixed techniques can be used. We chose automatic updating, which implies no work-
load, although it is rarely used since an organization often prefers to maintain full 
control over any installed software. In addition, our users are free to use an anti-virus 
or not on their PCs but updates are their responsibility. 
Although the server manages only one thousand accounts with relatively low traf-
fic, results are nonetheless significant.  
3.3   The collected data 
Figure 1 represents the temporal distribution of infected MIME parts vs. total in-
spected. We configure the system to substitute each infected part with a short mes-
sage (text/plain part) reporting info such as virus name, file size, MIME type/subtype.  
From August 1, 2001 until April 30, 2002 the SW examined 338442 MIME parts 
(with an average value of 37604 per month). A total of 15255 parts resulted infected 
by 48 different types of virus, with an average of 1695 per month, corresponding to 
4,42 %. 
130708
17698
43993
24753
267072668226581
2096620354
148871120655618498507271241
6777
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
August Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr
Total Inspected Parts Infected Parts
Fig. 1. Total scanned MIME parts vs. infected. A peak is registered in August mainly due to a 
propagation of one Sircam infection. 
Figure 2 shows incoming and outgoing infected parts. Note that the majority of vi-
ruses came from outside, but a peak of outgoing infected messages was present in 
February.  
The anti-virus SW block incoming and outgoing infected parts which cross the e-
mail server; however, users often have a personal free e-mail account not subject to 
the organization's control. In this case their PCs can become infected, and the virus 
subsequently tries to self-replicate via e-mail (i.e. sending an infected message to all 
addresses in the user's address book), network/resource sharing (copying itself in 
another vulnerable host), etc.  
If the virus uses its own SMTP libraries (or interacts with other "open relay" serv-
ers) to send infected messages, it bypasses the anti-virus running on the e-mail server, 
making it ineffective. 
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Fig. 2 - Infected MIME parts: incoming and outgoing. One peak of outgoing infected parts is 
present in February. 
New generation viruses (such as Sircam and Nimda) which spread by multiple 
media (e-mail, open network sharing, web sites, etc.) make their infection faster and 
their eradication more difficult. Their propagation can persist for long periods of 
time, although with lower intensity. 
Interesting data is provided by the types/subtypes of infected MIME parts as 
shown in Figure 3. Note that August values are not available, because the logging of 
MIME types/subtypes was enabled in September.  
Registered infected parts include application/mixed, application/octet-stream, au-
dio/x-wav, audio/x-midi, image/gif, application/x-msdownload, text/html, applica-
tion/ms-word, application/rtf, and application/applefile. 
Figure 4 shows the percentage of infected MIME types/subtypes. Actually the in-
spection of text/html parts was active only in October; otherwise, the percentile of 
infected html files would have been higher than the value reported in the figure.  
Viruses are frequently hidden in application/mixed contents, which group MIME 
parts with different types/subtypes and application/octet-stream, usually containing an 
executable file.  
Further an executable file may be uuencoded and put in a text/plain part thus to be 
effective the anti-virus SW needs to thoroughly inspect each MIME part. 
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Fig.3 - Location of viruses in MIME parts. Application/mixed shows two peaks in September 
and February, corresponding to the Sircam attacks; audio/x-wav peaks in November/December 
and in April due to Badtrans and Klez-G infections respectively (see Fig. 5). Applica-
tion/octect-stream does not peak but is constantly present. 
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Fig. 4 - Percentage of infected MIME parts. Application/mixed, application/octet-stream, and 
audio/x-wav registered higher values. 
Last, Figure 5 and Figure 6 show temporal distribution and percentage of well-
known viruses respectively. 
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Fig. 5 - Temporal distribution of well-known viruses. We can observe that Sircam peaks in 
August and in February. The Badtrans infection provoked lower peaks in November and De-
cember. The most recent peak, due to Klez-G, is registered in April. 
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Fig. 6 - Percentage of well-known viruses in the monitored period. Sircam-A is the main pres-
ence, followed by Magister (A and B versions). 
Recent attacks have used sophisticated techniques which combine worm-like 
propagation with Denial of Service activities, thus producing fast-spreading infec-
tions that cause enormous damage. Red Code, for instance, infected more than 
250,000 systems in just 9 hours on July 19, 2001 [2]. The strong penetration of these 
types of attacks shows that anti-virus software is not effective and must be integrated 
with other technologies such as anti-intrusion and survivability techniques. In particu-
lar, survivability, i.e. the ability of systems to preserve essential services in the pres-
ence of an adverse environment (i.e. in case of attacks or failures) in unbounded envi-
ronments, such as the Internet, is an open research topic [15]. 
In September 2001, we received an alert that a system in our network was scan-
ning the Internet for potential vulnerabilities: in fact, the Code Red Worm had in-
fected one of our systems (running MS IIS Servers). At this time we were using a 
transparent web caching architecture, thus all web traffic generated from our network 
was transparently intercepted and redirected (via router) toward a cache system. To 
detect the IP address of the infected system (hidden by the cache server), we needed 
to analyze the cache log files (containing the HTTP requests with the virus footprint). 
Actually, in order to respect Italian privacy law, we had anonymized log files (mask-
ing IP addresses of stations), so we first needed to change the cache server configura-
tion to later detect the address of the infected system and patch it [16]. 
This incident confirmed the previous observation (§2.1): on the Internet the sys-
tem’s exposure to attacks depends on the state of security of the rest of the network 
[2]. 
4   Conclusion 
Hackers and cyber-criminals who cause viral infection can be prosecuted under crimi-
nal law for their destructive behavior and sentenced [17]. Depending on national or 
international legislation, the inadvertent transmission of viruses, e.g. through an in-
fected e-mail attachment, or by means of unprotected servers, may also be subject to 
civil prosecution. 
In spite of this, the creation and spread of viruses is growing at an alarming rate 
and their degree of automation and sophistication is rapidly increasing. As technolo-
gies improve vulnerabilities are also on the rise, introducing security issues for hand-
helds and mobile phones.  
Today, there is no way to implement a totally secure policy but it is necessary to 
create a strategy and use combined technologies to fend off intruder attacks and com-
bat the virus plague.  
Costs sustained by the organization when defining and setting up a security policy 
represent a valuable investment for the future.  
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